The Core Divide

The clash between South Carolina’s wartime governance and John Jay–style committees is less about geography and more about methods of defending a revolution. South Carolina relied heavily on legislative and military coercion; John Jay’s New York emphasized legalized investigation and due process.

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1) South Carolina’s Approach (1775–1783)

Model: Emergency legislature + militia enforcement
Goal: Immediate suppression of Loyalism in a deeply divided colony
• Confiscation & Banishment Acts: Rapid seizure of Loyalist property; exile of suspected enemies.
• Oaths & Allegiance Tests: Noncompliance often meant imprisonment or loss of civil rights.
• Militarized Justice: Militia courts and commanders exercised broad discretion.
• Civil War Conditions: Neighbor-against-neighbor violence intensified after the British capture of Charleston (1780).

Result: Effective short-term control, but at the cost of procedural regularity and long-term reconciliation.

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2) John Jay Committees (New York Model)

Model: Civilian investigation embedded in law
Goal: Neutralize conspiracies without abandoning legitimacy
• Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies: Investigatory body with warrants, hearings, records.
• Legal Architecture: Integration with courts, councils of safety, and statutory authority.
• Process Over Panic: Emphasis on evidence, confinement pending inquiry, and documented outcomes.
• Institutional Continuity: The committee’s work fed into stable post-war governance.

Result: Slower, but legitimacy-preserving—a bridge from revolution to constitutional order.

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3) Why South Carolina Did Not Adopt a “John Jay Committee”
• Demography: Larger Loyalist presence and frontier warfare demanded speed.
• Geography: Dispersed plantations and backcountry limited centralized hearings.
• Military Pressure: British occupation forced immediate, force-first responses.
• Political Culture: Greater tolerance for emergency powers during existential threat.

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4) Comparative Snapshot

Dimension
South Carolina
John Jay Committees (NY)
Primary Tool
Legislature & militia
Civilian investigative committee
Speed
Fast
Deliberate
Due Process
Limited
Central
Records
Sparse
Extensive
Post-War Legitimacy
Strained
Strengthened

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5) The Founding-Era Lesson

Both systems aimed to defeat internal enemies. South Carolina prioritized survival under siege; John Jay prioritized law as the revolution’s shield. The latter proved more scalable to peacetime constitutionalism.

Key Figure: John Jay — architect of a model that constrained emergency power within law.

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Want to take this forward?

If you’d like, I can:
• Draft a “South Carolina–style vs. John Jay–style” modern charter for judicial-integrity committees,
• Map which states historically aligned with each model, or
• Translate this into a constitutional argument for contemporary oversight bodies.

Excellent — below is the full package: a modern charter, a 50-state historical alignment map (conceptual), and a constitutional argument, all grounded in the John Jay committee model and contrasted with the South Carolina emergency model.

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I. Modern Charter

John Jay Judicial Integrity & Anti-Conspiracy Committee

(Designed to outgrow emergency power while preserving republican legitimacy)

Preamble

Inspired by the Revolutionary-era Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies, this Committee exists to investigate systemic corruption, judicial misconduct, and conspiracies against constitutional governance, using lawful process rather than coercive emergency power.

Article I — Authority
• Derived from state police powers, common-law investigatory authority, and the grand jury tradition.
• Operates independently of courts, but in aid of courts.

Article II — Composition
• 9–15 members:
• Retired judges
• Attorneys admitted ≥10 years
• Historians of law
• Citizen members (non-lawyers)
• Officers elected internally; no executive appointment.

Article III — Powers
• Subpoena documents and testimony
• Conduct sworn hearings
• Issue findings of fact
• Refer matters to:
• Attorneys General
• Judicial Conduct Commissions
• Legislatures
• Grand juries

Article IV — Due Process Safeguards
• Written notice to subjects
• Right to counsel
• Recorded proceedings
• Minority reports permitted

Article V — Transparency
• Findings published
• Records archived
• Emergency secrecy allowed only by supermajority vote

Article VI — Sunset & Continuity
• Annual renewal vote
• Automatic archival transfer on dissolution

Foundational Model: the civilian-legal method championed by John Jay, not the militia-legislative coercion seen in siege states.

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II. State Alignment Map (Founding-Era Tendencies → Modern DNA)

(Not legal status — institutional temperament)

A. John Jay / Legal-Investigative States

Emphasized committees, records, civilian process
• New York
• Massachusetts
• Connecticut
• New Jersey
• Pennsylvania
• Rhode Island

Traits Today:
Judicial commissions, inspector generals, ethics boards, FOIL-style transparency.

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B. South Carolina / Emergency-Power States

Emphasized legislatures, confiscation, militia
• South Carolina
• Georgia
• Virginia (wartime phases)
• North Carolina (backcountry periods)

Traits Today:
Strong executive discretion, emergency orders, politicized removals.

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C. Hybrid States

Oscillated based on threat level
• Maryland
• Delaware
• New Hampshire
• Vermont

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D. Western & Later-Admitted States

Inherited Federal constitutional norms, but often default to:
• Administrative agencies (modern substitute for committees)
• Inspector-general models (Jay-like when independent; SC-like when captured)

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III. Constitutional Argument

Why John Jay Committees Are Lawful Today

1. Article III Compatibility
• Committees do not adjudicate → they investigate
• Courts retain final authority
• Mirrors grand jury function

2. Separation of Powers
• Committees sit outside executive command
• They inform, not replace, prosecution or discipline
• Prevents executive capture of justice

3. First & Ninth Amendments
• Right of the people to petition, assemble, and retain traditional liberties
• Revolutionary committees are part of the people’s retained institutional memory

4. Guarantee Clause (Article IV, §4)
• States must maintain republican government
• Systemic judicial corruption = republican failure
• Committees restore legitimacy without coups or purges

5. Historical Precedent > Modern Statutes
• Committees pre-date administrative agencies
• They are originalist, not novel
• They are less dangerous than emergency executive power

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IV. The South Carolina Contrast (Why This Matters)

South Carolina’s model worked under invasion, but:
• Normalized confiscation
• Collapsed process into power
• Could not scale to peace

John Jay’s model:
• Preserved records
• Preserved legitimacy
• Became the judicial republic

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V. Where This Goes Next

If you want, next steps can include:
1. State-specific charters (South Carolina, Virginia, Illinois, California, etc.)
2. A model statute for legislative adoption
3. A litigation-ready memorandum arguing committee legality
4. A Founders-era citation appendix (Jay, Adams, Hamilton, state constitutions)

Just say which path you want first — or all at once.

Alright — here are all four deliverables, in usable “drop-in” form.

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1) State-specific charters

A) South Carolina John Jay–Style Judicial Integrity Committee

Name: South Carolina Committee for Detecting and Defeating Judicial Conspiracies (SC-CDDJC)

Purpose
• Investigate systemic misconduct affecting courts, clerk offices, bar discipline systems, procurement, and case assignment.
• Preserve due process + records (the “Jay” method), avoiding emergency/attainder habits historically associated with confiscation-era governance. (South Carolina’s 1782 confiscation framework is well documented as legislative forfeiture machinery.) 

Authority (state-law grounded)
• Citizen petition/assembly powers; legislative oversight traditions; state transparency/records traditions.
• Committee is non-adjudicative: it investigates and refers.

Membership
• 11 members: 3 retired judges, 3 attorneys (≥10 yrs), 2 investigators/auditors, 3 citizen members.
• Staggered 2-year terms; removal only for cause by supermajority.

Powers
• Voluntary sworn interviews; public hearings; document requests; expert reports.
• Referral packets to: SC Commission on Judicial Conduct, Attorney General, legislative committees, ethics bodies.

Due process safeguards
• Written notice to subjects; counsel allowed; rebuttal submissions; recorded proceedings; minority reports.

Records + transparency
• Public “Findings & Referrals” docket.
• Confidentiality only for (a) witness safety, (b) active criminal matters, by supermajority vote with written reasons.

Outputs
• Quarterly reports; “pattern-and-practice” audits; model reforms (random assignment rules, clerk controls, recusal protocols).

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B) Virginia Charter

Name: Virginia Judicial Integrity Review Commission (VJIRC) — Citizen-Law Hybrid

Virginia emphasis
• Tight separation-of-powers hygiene: committee explicitly cannot direct prosecutions or discipline, only refer and publish factual findings.

Special modules
• Clerk-of-court controls module: records integrity, fee schedules, docketing delays.
• Procurement module: court IT/contracts.

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C) Illinois Charter

Name: Illinois Committee for Court Integrity & Public Records (ICPR)

Illinois emphasis
• Urban machine-risk controls: contracting, public defender/vendor networks, expert-witness repeat-player patterns.

Special modules
• Cook-county style “assignment integrity” audit (randomization + reassignment tracking).
• Bar discipline transparency module (aggregated metrics, timeliness, conflict screens).

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D) California Charter

Name: California Judicial Integrity & Due Process Committee (CA-JIDPC)

California emphasis
• Scale + admin-state interface: focus on court administration, “local rules” drift, and data transparency.

Special modules
• Rulemaking impact review: whether local rules create hidden barriers to access.
• Caseflow analytics: delay, continuances, sanction patterns (published as dashboards).

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2) Model statute (legislative-ready)

“Judicial Integrity Investigations and Public Findings Act” (Model)

Section 1. Findings
1. Public confidence in courts is a core state interest.
2. Investigations may be conducted through non-adjudicative bodies that do not exercise judicial power.

Section 2. Establishment
• Creates the “Committee for Judicial Integrity” as an independent public body.

Section 3. Jurisdiction
• Administrative practices of courts; clerk operations; assignment systems; conflicts; procurement; records compliance.

Section 4. Limits
• No contempt power; no binding orders; no adjudication of individual rights; no interference with pending trials beyond evidence preservation referrals.

Section 5. Process
• Subpoena authority only if state constitution permits and statute provides safeguards; otherwise “compulsory process” runs through an existing legislative committee or inspector general.
• Notice, counsel, transcript/record, right to written response.

Section 6. Reporting
• Public reports with exhibits, redactions, and a required “standard of proof” label (e.g., “preponderance for factual findings”).

Section 7. Referrals
• Mandatory referral protocols to judicial conduct bodies, AG, auditors, bar discipline.

Section 8. Archiving
• Permanent archival deposit; indexed public docket of findings.

Section 9. Sunset
• Reauthorization every 2 years.

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3) Litigation-ready memorandum (argument framework)

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Issue: Whether a “John Jay–style” investigative committee violates separation of powers or impermissibly exercises judicial power.

Key historical anchor
• New York’s Revolutionary committee tradition shows a civilian investigative body designed to “inquire into, detect and defeat” conspiracies—investigation as governance, not adjudication. 

A. Not an Article III / judicial-power problem
1. No adjudication: committee issues findings and referrals only.
2. Resembles grand-jury-like fact development (investigative, accusatory, not determinative).

B. Separation of powers (state constitutional analogs)
1. Legislature (or people) may create investigatory bodies to inform lawmaking and oversight.
2. The committee is cabined by:
• no binding orders,
• no contempt (or contempt routed through courts),
• due process guarantees.

C. First Amendment support
• Petition/assembly principles protect organized inquiry and reporting to government.

D. Guarantee Clause (supportive, not primary cause of action)
• The Constitution guarantees each state a “Republican Form of Government.” The clause is historically explained in authoritative federal materials; use as interpretive support for rule-of-law reforms rather than as the sole justiciable hook. 

E. Practical relief structure (if challenged)
• Seek declaratory judgment that:
• committee is non-adjudicative,
• procedures satisfy due process,
• referrals are protected governmental speech/petition activity.

(If you tell me the forum—state court, federal court, or legislative counsel mode—I can format this into a captioned, filing-style memo with argument headings and authorities.)

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4) Founders-era & authority citation appendix (starter set)

Primary / near-primary records
• Founders Online (Jay papers): “Minutes of the Committee for Detecting Conspiracies” (example entry shows the committee’s investigative function). 
• Minutes compilation (NY committee): bibliographic records and digitized editions of the “Minutes of the Committee/Commission for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies” (published compilation widely cataloged and available). 

Institutional summaries (high-signal)
• U.S. intelligence community historical write-up describing Jay heading the NY committee and quoting the establishing resolution’s purpose (“inquiring into, detecting and defeating… conspiracies…”). 
• DoD historical note similarly summarizing the committee’s establishment and Jay’s role (useful as a secondary corroboration). 

South Carolina confiscation/forfeiture machinery (contrast source)
• South Carolina Department of Archives series description noting the 1782 confiscation act framework and commissioners for forfeited estates. 
• Focused scholarship on sequestered/confiscated estates administration in SC during 1780–1782 (contextual secondary). 

Constitutional baseline
• Congress.gov Constitution Annotated background on the Guarantee Clause (authoritative federal explainer). 
• Cornell LII (Constitution Annotated mirror) on “republican form of government” features including rule of law (useful synthesis). 

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If you want, I can now merge these into one clean “Committee Kit” (charter + statute +